The Subprime Crisis and the European Banking Sector: the Renewal of Universal Banks? by Elisabeth Paulet
Economic Policy in the Wake of the Crisis  AE 
 
    
 
Special Number 3 • November 2009                                                                                               684 
 
THE SUBPRIME CRISIS AND THE EUROPEAN BANKING SECTOR: THE 




* * * * 







Since  the  90's,  European  banks  have  sustained  numerous  structural  disturbances.  Their 
degree  of  integration  combined  with  the  universality  of  our  institutions  in  the  banking 
sector may then be an important factor to take into account in appreciating its resistance to 
systemic shocks. In this first part, the correlation between size and systemic risk will be 
discussed. The current financial deregulation has permitted the entry onto the market of 
institutions,  which  are  traditionally  non-banking  institutions  (insurance  companies, 
institutional investors, pension funds). It would be interesting to measure the influence of 
these newcomers on the evolution of banking integration. This is the object of part two of 
this analysis. The last stage will consist in an attempt to evaluate the systemic risk in the 
framework of the new financial environment. The subprime crisis and the unequal reaction 
of banking institutions will lead us to two questions: “Will this crisis lead to a renewal of 
the  predominance  for  universal  banks?”  and  “Will  the  new  process  of  integration  in 
banking sector guarantee stability at the international level?” 
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Since the 90's, banks in Europe have sustained numerous structural disturbances.  The trend 
toward institutions which are primarily universal in their function is an illustration of these 
transformations. These changes have led to instability factors known as systemic risk. Why 
does  systemic  risk  emerge?  How  can  this  concept  be  defined?  Michel  Aglietta  (1991) 
delimits this new phenomenon by “the possibility for an economy that situations arise in 
which the response on the part of agents to the risks they perceive, far from leading to a 
better distribution of individual risks (through an insurance process for example) lead to a 
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rise in overall insecurity”.  
The degree of integration in the banking sector may then be an important factor to take into 
account in appreciating its resistance to systemic shocks.  Indeed, it may constitute a factor 
of vulnerability, inasmuch as the possible failure of a very large institution would have 
considerable repercussions on the entire financial system.  Combined with the universality 
of  our  institutions,  this  parameter  can  only  grow  in  its  scope.    In  this  first  part,  the 
correlation between size and systemic risk will be discussed.   The second objective of the 
analysis will be to measure the capability for universal banks to face systemic shocks. By 
comparing their structure and activities, the conclusion could lead to a better diversification 
in their risk management.  The last stage will consist in an attempt to evaluate the systemic 
risk  in  the  framework  of  the  new  financial  environment.  The  subprime  crisis  and  the 
unequal reaction of banking institutions will lead us to two questions: 
·  Will this crisis lead to a renewal of the predominance for universal banks?  
·  Will the new process of integration in banking sector guarantee stability at the 
international level?   
 
1. The unresolved issue of the correlation between size and the increase of systemic 
risk: the size-efficiency ratio 
 
1.1 Methodological difficulties 
The examination of the banking strategies in Europe and in the United States reveals the 
growth in the size of the network, and portrays integration movements as the two axes 
which  structure  the  policy  of  penetrating  new  market  segments.  The  issues  of  market 
structure and the possible optimal size of a firm are therefore on a par with a bank's activity. 
Numerous studies devoted to economies of scale have endeavored to highlight an optimal 
size  or,  at  least,  to  prove  the  existence  of  a  decrease  in  efficiency  beyond  a  certain 
threshold. Relying on a study of the properties of the average cost curve, it shows that this 
curve presents the usual U-form (which reflects first increasing returns of scale and then 
decreasing), and that the optimal size of the firm corresponds to its minimum. 
In the banking sector the notion corresponding to economies of scale is therefore “joint 
production”.  Indeed, such economies may be realized each time that certain inputs are used 
with no additional cost, in order to produce goods other than those originally manufactured.  
In other words, we shall refer to economies of scale when, at a given level of production, 
the costs corresponding to a joint production process are lower than those resulting from the 
sum of the costs associated with independent production processes. 
The application of these notions to banking strategy raises certain difficulties, however.  
The main problems stem from the lack of any definition on the unanimously accepted role 
played by the banks in the intermediation process. Consequently, no generally accepted 
model exists representing the bank production process. The reserves expressed with respect 
to the different representations of the bank's production or cost functions have a twofold 
origin.  The  first  is  circumstantial  and  lies  in  the  diversity  of  existing  regulatory 
frameworks,  and  the  effects  they  have  on  the  banking  strategy  and  the  functioning  of Economic Policy in the Wake of the Crisis  AE 
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markets, while the second, more fundamental, is the strong similitude between banking 
inputs and outputs (always monetary and financial assets) 
1. 
Lastly, additional difficulties stem from the multi-product nature of banking firms. This 
issue, largely debated since the advent of the theory of contestable markets at the beginning 
of  the  eighties
2,  has  not  been  exhausted.  Indeed,  the  use  of  the  balance  sheet  items, 
incorporated  in  the  framework  of  financial  ratios  or  considered  individually,  does  not 
permit the expression of output in physical terms. Moreover, the development of activities 
outside the current balance-sheet which generate revenue for banks (but are excluded by the 
usual  accounting  procedures)  makes  it  difficult  to  characterize  the  bank's  production 
function. It appears that another approach must be sought in the use of proxy variables such 
as the number of accounts managed. Nonetheless, this type of solution comes up against 
practical  constraints  linked  to  the  difficulty  collecting  sufficiently  extensive  and 
homogeneous data. 
Thus, a twofold debate structure the literature devoted to the bank development in the 
industrial economy approach. The first facet, concerning the economic definition of the 
banking firm, strives to decide between an approach in production terms and a more recent 
analysis emphasizing intermediation. The second facet, of a technical nature, concerns the 
specification retained for the cost function, as the form chosen
3 impacts the evaluation of 
indicators of economies of scale and scope. The theoretical underlying option retained in 
the  various  econometric  studies  available  therefore  influences  the  results  obtained 
considerably, as we shall demonstrate in the following paragraph. 
 
1.2 Highly equivocal empirical studies available 
The strategies adopted by banks such as Barclays, National Westminster or Dresdner in an 
attempt  to  reach  a  dominant  position  on  the  European  market  and  protect  themselves 
effectively against new competitors on their respective national markets, are marked by a 
                                                 
1  For  example,  deposits  may  also  be  considered  as  inputs  or  outputs  depending  on  whether  we 
perceive banks as institutions which transform claims into assets presenting varying degrees of risk 
and liquidity or, in a more conventional manner, as firms for which deposits, like work and capital, 
are considered as resources. 
2 We recall that in the case of a multi-product industry, Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1988) showed 
that  if  a  sustainable  allocation  exists,  it  necessarily  meets  the  five  following  conditions:  1)  the 
industry  minimizes  costs,  2)  each  company  achieves  a  profit  level  which  is  null  (the  firm's 
equilibrium), 3) revenue made on a sub-set of products amounts at least to the savings made if the 
firms did not produce these goods, 4) the prices of the products are equal to the marginal production 
costs  and  5)  when  barriers  to  entry  exist,  the  sustainable  prices  are  equal  to  the  marginal  cost 
weighted by the factor of the elasticity of demand for the product (pricing at the Ramsey price).  
3 The two most frequently encountered forms are the Cobb-Douglas function the advantage of which 
is its ease of use but which, due to the fact that it is limited by assumptions of the invariability of scale 
productions compared to the level of output and mono-production, is increasingly replaced by a trans-
logarithmic function such as:  
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belief that they can benefit by increasing their size which implies the reduction of  costs
4. 
(Figure no. 1) 
  - better  gathering 
of information 
 
  Economies of scale: 
- specific to a product  
- depending on banking firm. 
 










- effect  of 
notoriety 
  Economies of variety: 
- global (cost of joint production < 
S  of  costs  in  case  of  separate 
production), 
- specific  to  the  product  (the 
product  costs  less  when  it  is 
manufactured  at  the  same  time  as 
other products) 
Figure no. 1: Impact of size on economy of scale and scope 
 
The empirical tests, which constitute the basis for adopting such strategies, are constructed 
considering cost functions in which the exogenous variables are the price of production 
factors, the level and composition of output. The functional relationship on which they rely 
is a direct derivative of standard micro-economics given that it consists in pointing out a 
link  between  cost  and  the  production  function.  For  years,  the  search  for  satisfactory 
production functions mobilized authors who conventionally turned to the standard Cobb-
Douglas  form  which  they  abandoned  progressively  due  to  the  restrictive  assumptions 
underlying it. 
The  empirical  studies  on  economies  of  scale  and  scope  in  the  banking  sector  focus  in 
particular on the construction of cost curves specific to the various institutional categories 
of establishments in an effort to appreciate the extent to which an increase in size can 
contribute to reducing total costs. Up to now, the efforts made in this line of research have 
not produced unequivocal results and have failed to eliminate certain assumptions once and 
for all.  More precisely, the results differ greatly depending on whether the banking firms 
are considered as mono- or multi-productive. 
                                                 
4 We note that in numerous cases this tendency was promoted by the Public Authorities and the 
central banks convinced of the principle of “too big to fail” as a means of reducing the systemic risk 
while not accentuating their role as lenders of last resort. (see Roth, M. (1994): Too Big to Fail and 
the Stability of the Banking System: Some Insights from Foreign Countries Business Economies, Vol. 
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The  studies  which  rely  on  mono-product  functions  lead  to  the  existence  of  significant 
economies of scale,  while  more recent research  which considers the banking  firm as  a 
multi-productive entity shows that the increase in returns linked to the growth in the size of 
the  firm  is  perceivable  only  in  small  establishments.  Beyond  a  certain  threshold,  the 
increase in output is reflected, on the contrary, in a drop in performances. Although this 
type of result indeed confirms the existence of a minimum scale of efficiency, it does not 
allow us to close the debate on the possible existence of economies of scale in the banking 
sector once and for all. 
With respect to the European area, the various analyses proposed (cf. Canals, J. (1993); 
Dietsch, M. and L. Weill (1996)) do not succeed in pinpointing the existence of a stable, 
pre-determined relation between the various classes of size and the degree of diversification 
of the activity in the various banking establishments studied.  These results lead them to the 
conclusion that no optimal size, or optimal combination or line of financial products exists, 
at least in the case of France.  This conclusion is confirmed in their study of the Belgian 
banking system, which permits them to demonstrate that the largest establishments sustain 
diseconomies of scale.  We find the same confusion on the Italian level.  Indeed, certain 
studies mention significant cost cuts negatively correlated to the average growth size of 
banking establishments: this means that the effective size of Italian banking establishments 
is  noticeably  lower  than  their  optimal  size.  Other  authors  distinguish  enterprises  and 
establishments.  They  report  on  the  existence  of  increasing  scale  returns  each  time  the 
increase in the level of output is followed by the stability of the number of branch offices 
composing the network. On the contrary, considering a variable number of bank offices, the 
economies  of  scale  then  benefit  only  small  and  middle-size  establishments.  As  usually 
admitted, it is possible to infer that as such the banking network is operated in a sub-
optimal manner: an increase in the size of the branch offices would make it possible to 
derive benefit from a drop in costs, and consequently to enhance profitability. 
The  limited  relevance  of  variables  reflecting  scale  effects  in  the  cost  or  production 
functions, except at low output levels, raises numerous questions about the effects to be 
expected of integration in the banking sector
5.  In fact, it appears that, like for any other 
type  of  activity,  banking  can  also  generate  increasing  scale  revenues  whenever  high 
establishment  costs  or  indivisible  inputs  exist.  Similarly,  the  profits  associated  with  an 
increase of size for a firm can be the result of organizational factors (better production 
management), a better competitive position (reductions or payment delay granted on the 
purchases of large quantities of inputs) or the incorporation of a technical progress.  
We witness a similar debate in the case of economies of variety on which the defenders of 
the  universal  bank  rely  to  report  profits  correlated  with  a  multi-product  firm.  Thus, 
numerous French banks have opted for the diversification scenario without valuable proof 
of the existence of profits due to broader product lines. 
The various studies mentioned up until now appear to totally pave the way in the search for 
efficiency in the banking sector. And yet, the absence of a unanimously accepted approach 
combined with environmental changes seems to leave the necessary leeway for performing 
additional research. This is indeed the perspective of the next section, which is aimed at 
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casting new light on the issue of the relationship between performances and the universality 
of banking firms. 
 
2. Universality and systemic risk 
 I.  Walter  (1997)  in  a  paper  entitled:  ‘Universal  banking:  A  Shareholder  value’ 
distinguishes four types of banking structure: 
·  totally integrated universal banks  which provide a broad sampling of  financial 
services  (banking  services,  securities  and  insurance)  in  a  single  corporative 
structure supported by a unique social capital.  So far, no good example of this 
model exists; 
·  partially  integrated  banks  which  conduct  both  commercial  and  investment 
activities in a same entity, but which distribute insurance, provide consulting and 
specialized services through separate branches, either because these services are 
subject to different regulations, or because they may be at the source of conflicts 
of interest requiring special management. The Deutsche Bank AG constitutes a 
good example of this type of organization; 
·  commercial banks whose principal operations consist in collecting deposits and 
granting  loans  and  subsidiary  in  providing  financial  activities  ranging  from 
investments to insurance contracts.  Barclays Bank Plc is an illustration of this 
model; 
·  holding  companies  which  control  affiliated  companies  performing  all  sorts  of 
commercial,  investment,  insurance  activities  as  well  as  a  great  number  of 
operations which can be financial or not.  Examples can be found through J.P. 
Morgan and CS Holding. 
Why then to return to the various forms of universalism in a context of systemic risk? To 
return, in order to justify their capacity of resistance to shocks. Numerous authors have 
considered that the introduction of financial economies of scale induced a reduction of 
risks. In fact the effect of economies of scale varies according to the initial structure of the 
banking system. The greater the bank share on the banking market for deposits and loans, 
the higher the intermediation margin (the difference between the rates at which the bank 
remunerates  itself  and  that  at  which  it  refinances  itself).  This  constitutes  one  of  the 
specificity of universal bank activities. Traditional large commercial banks’ balance sheet 
can be characterized by the following equation:  
Liabilities clients transactions (deposits) - Asset clients transactions (loans)  <  0              (1)   
In addition their off balance sheet is much larger than their balance sheets (sometimes more 
than 20 times the total assets as for the BNP Paribas) 
In a situation of weak competition, each bank will have a tendency to use its market power 
to increase interest rates on loans and to reduce those remunerating deposits. Thus the more 
concentrated the system, the  more capable it is of  generating high profits. In short, an 
increase in size does not necessarily entail an increase in financial profits. The theoretical 
analysis relies more on the relation between size and banking cost than on banking structure 
to explain the efficiency of banking institutions. The core of the argument is based on the Economic Policy in the Wake of the Crisis  AE 
 
    
 
Special Number 3 • November 2009                                                                                               690 
capacity  of  diversified  banking  institutions  to  acquire  the  information  necessary  for 
maintaining  their  solvency.  The  ensuing  cost  is  lower  for  universal  banks  than  for 
specialized establishments due to the role of economies of scale from which they benefit 
due to their size.   
In that context, how can we describe the activities of an investment banks and their profit 
margin? Most clients of investment banks are big enterprises and financial institutions: they 
bring their liquidity to the investment bank (deposit side), the bank offers access to equity 
capital markets, debt capital markets (financial participation and syndicated credit). Their 
off balance sheets are less important than a universal bank as most derivative products are 
part of their core activities and included in the balance sheet. This explains their sensibility 
to the subprime crisis. Does this statement justifies an argument in favour of universal 
banks  and  integrated  banking  system?  In  a  European  context,  the  differences  of  profit 
between  specialized  establishments  and  universal  banks  are  much  less  significant.    In 
particular, debt contracts do not reflect a considerable differentiation of interest rates as we 
might  have  expected.  Moreover,  O.  Pastre  (2001)  mentions  that  the  existence  and  the 
development of small size banking structure are possible under six basic conditions: 
·  prohibition to practice in activities where economies of scale are important; 
·  specialization is compulsory; 
·  flexibility is required; 
·  control of the level of risk is necessary; 
·  cooperation has to be developed; 
·  margins must not be sacrificed. 
Therefore, universality could only be an advantage as regards risk management. Hence, O. 
Pastre’s hypotheses for a development of small size seem difficult to reach in a context 
where cooperation is rare and integration is increasing. Our next step will be then to exhibit 
that, considering the evolution of financial markets, universal banks are more adapted for 
financing managerial projects.  
 
3. Banks and Subprime crisis: a challenge for  more efficiency in the globalization 
context 
 
3.1 Banks and financial markets in a crisis context: competition or cooperation?  
Over the last years, capital markets have been used differently in the USA and in Europe as 
regards the financial policy for firms. Up to 2000, the firms have increased their use of 
financial markets in comparison to banks. In the United States, the main actors (the NYSE 
for mature firms and the NASDAQ for companies in expansion) are clearly identified. In 
Europe, a large number of financial places still exist. The most important one as regards 
capitalisation  (e.g.  table  no.  1)  is  the  London  Stock  Exchange  followed  by  Euronext. 
Moreover  the  number  of  listed  companies  is  not  comparable  to  the  figure  given  for 
American firms. Enterprises rely more on credit banking than on stocks for the financing of AE  The Subprime Crisis and the European Banking Sector: the Renewal of Universal 
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their project (e.g. Paulet 2003). Except for the case of United Kingdom where the financial 
markets are very developed (since the nineteenth century), French and German companies 
finance their project through banking credit. Even if the beginning of the millennium has 
experienced an increase of markets as regards financial policy for firms, the successive 
speculative bubbles have not confirmed this movement. On the contrary, in countries where 
universal banks are dominant (like Germany), banks have recovered their place. For other 
partners,  the  structure  of  industry  where  small  and  medium  size  enterprises  (SME) 
represent  80%  of  all  companies  could  justify  the  choice  in  favour  of  banks  for  their 
investment projects.  
Table no. 1: Major actors of financial sector: spot market (31/12/2002) 
  Capitalisation (in 
billions) 
Number of listed 
companies 
NYSE  8654  2366 
Tokyo stock exchange  1986  2153 
Nasdaq  1915  3649 
Euronext  1477  1484 
LSE  1708  2824 
Deutsche Börse  658  934 
Source: Euronext, LES, FESE, FIBV 
The financial integration has been a factor of rapid transmission of crisis. The financial 
crisis  has  extended  to  real  world.  Hence,  enterprises  and  agents  have  assisted  to  a 
significant  decrease  of  their  profit  and  revenue.  They  have  become  more  and  more 
cautious,  inducing  a  contraction  of  consumption  and  investment.  Hence,  negative 
expectations are reinforced by the general context of uncertainty as regards the solvency of 
banks and the magnitude and length of recession. The consequence is the volatility of the 
financial markets as exhibited by figure no. 2: the major financial indices are broken down 
up to 38% (FTSE 100) and 58% (Nikkei) between June 2007 and February 2008. 
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Figure no. 2: Fluctuations on financial markets (2000-2008) 
 
At the same time, banks have then become more vulnerable. The monopolies coming from 
the merger acquisitions in that sector have been undermined by the penetration onto the 
market of new suppliers of financial services.  This has had consequences both on the level 
of the prices at which the banking products are supplied and on that of their profit margins. 
The enormous increase of derivatives and the role played by off balance sheet items have 
generated instability for the banking system. The subprime crisis illustrates perfectly this 
point  by  giving  evidence  that  specialized  institutions  like  investment  banks  have  used 
securitization  process  to  transform  non  performing  loans  into  junk  assets.  The  inter-
connection  among  institutions  and  financial  markets  has  contributed  to  the  transfer  of 
systemic  risk  from  United  States  to  Europe.  However  the  particularities  of  banking 
structures in Europe (more oriented towards universal banks) is a factor of explanation of 
the difference of magnitude of the financial crisis between these parts of the world.  
Size has been a continuous preoccupation over the last twenty years. Its measure has even 
changed.  In  the  old  standard,  total  assets  were  often  used  to  evaluate  the  size  of  an 
institution. Now market capitalization and adequacy of bank capital on a risk adjusted basis 
are privileged. The new crisis context makes us guess that the integration trend (which had 
decreased  over  the  last  decade)  will  again  be  considered  as  an  efficient  tool  to  avoid 
banking  run.  Hence,  as  the  inter-connection  of  financial  markets  accentuates  contagion 
phenomena, the next question therefore is threefold:  
·  Is  it  possible  to  evaluate  and  prevent  the  systemic  risk  in  our  global  banking 
system? Is integration the unique tool to avoid banking crisis?  AE  The Subprime Crisis and the European Banking Sector: the Renewal of Universal 
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·  Does the actual crisis appeal to new considerations as regards the core business of 
a banker in the XIX century?  
·  Could European prudential agencies have a leader role in that process? 
These are the questions we intend to discuss now.  
 
3.2 Banks and Subprime crisis: a challenge for more efficiency in the globalization 
context 
Let us first recall the core factors which describe the subprime crisis. First, the crisis has led 
to a mortgage bubble in the United States. This has affected of course mortgage companies 
but also specialized investment institutions and partly universal banks. Third, it has induced 
a global liquidity crisis both in the States and Europe. Fourth, the collapse of structured 
investment  products  derived  from  the  affected  assets  shifted  the  global  liquidity  into 
commodity futures. The aim of this section is to evaluate the magnitude of this crisis of 
European and American banks.  
One cannot doubt that banks bear a large responsibility of the actual financial situation. 
They were perfectly aware of the nature and the extent of the continued exposure to their 
off balance risk and their asset based securitization (ABS) they carried on their balance 
sheet.  The  explosion  of  these  new  products  and  these  new  actors  as  discussed  in  the 
previous paragraph has contributed to increase the global level of risk and to the emergence 
of systemic risk. This excessive disintermediation and the large amount of liquidity on the 
market could then be considered at the origin of the global financial crisis that affected both 
banking institutions and financial markets.  
Academic researchers and professional financers agree to consider investment banks  as 
originators of the crisis. Our purpose is to support the argument that universal banking 
model is more resilient to face the current situation. Buiter (2007) affirms that universal 
banks have a wider variety of assets than investment banks, which allows them to spread 
the credit risk across a broader range of asset categories.  Despite the fact we share this 
position, it cannot be denied that large universal banks such as Société Générale, UBS, 
BNP Paribas, and Crédit Suisse among others have shown large losses stemming from their 
vast  exposure  to  risky  mortgages  and  derivatives  securities.  Several  arguments  can  be 
addressed to undermine this situation.  
As mentioned by the actual president of the Deutsche Bank, Mr Banziger, more diversified 
banks  are  better  able  to  solve  their  own  problems  in  crisis  time.  They  can  provision 
liquidity to support eventual losses. Their balance sheets encompass earning streams and 
they  raise  funds  in  both  wholesale  and  retail  markets.  Hence,  the  diverse  sources  of 
earnings ensure that losses in one area can be offset with other gains in functional areas.  
The  results  will  lead  to  reduce  their  annual  profit  but  to  avoid  liquidity  or  solvency 
difficulties.  
Second, bigger banks not only enjoy the advantage of diversity but also have much more 
scope to sell off assets in time of trouble. American investment banks were not sharing this 
situation. Their asset-to-equity ratios prevent them from a rapid de-leveraging in case of 
serious financial crisis (e.g. Table no. 2) Economic Policy in the Wake of the Crisis  AE 
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Table no. 2: Expanded leverage asset-to-equity ratios 
  2005  2007 
Bear Sterns  26  33 
Morgan Stanley  31  33 
Lehman Brothers  25  31 
Merill Lynch  18  28 
Goldman Sachs  25  27 
Third, universal banks seem to be more efficient to restore capital ratios to more reasonable 
level. Those which were not capable of reacting promptly have been absorbed by stronger 
institutions (e.g. BNP Paribas – Fortis). Hence, one may expect a new wave of mergers or 
acquisitions of commercial banks by better capitalized investment banks once their write 
downs are completed. Then the concentration process and the methodological difficulties to 
identify real universal banks are going to become more crucial in the following years. As 
discussed previously, if integration could be in the first stage a guarantee to avoid solvency 
problems,  it  is  not  without  influence  on  the  existence  of  systemic  risk  for  the  global 
banking  system.  To  prevent  such  a  situation  to  occur,  a  solution  could  be  a  better 
transparency  of  balance  sheets  of  banks  and  more  specifically  their  practice  of  risk 
transferring to derivative products.  
Fourth,  the  situation  is  not  uniform  in  whole  Europe.  The  banking  systems  of  Eastern 
countries are more vulnerable than the ones of the Euro Zone. Three main reasons can be 
found: 
·  a high penetration of foreign banks (which represent in average 70% of the whole 
banking  system;  while  facing  solvency  difficulties,  the  first  reactions  of  these 
institutions have been to recall their funds in their home countries; 
·  a depreciation of their currencies: hence a currency crisis must be added to the 
financial one (cf. Figure no. 3); 
·  a decrease of the foreign direct investment, which constitutes a strong support to 
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Figure  no. 3: Currency risk in Europe 
Source: Eurostat and Jean François Jamet and Frank Lirzin (2009) 
 
Hence, the subprime crisis has then shown the fragility and inequality of European banking 
system. As far as the Euro zone is concerned, the last crisis has induced a reinforcement of 
universal banks and the new trend of merger and acquisitions. This last factor, if efficient in 
a first step to reduce systemic risk, could later on lead to more instability: a risky attitude of 
a huge institution could oblige central authorities to intervene according to the ‘Too big to 
fail’ principle. For Eastern countries, the question is even more delicate: this crisis has 
pointed out the necessity to build up a banking system based on domestic roots. This will 
imply  time  and  a  real  implication  of  national  authorities.  In  doing  so,  the  foreign 
institutions will reinforce local banks and not substitute them. The second point concerns an 
acceleration of monetary integration in order to reduce the impact of currency fluctuations.  
As a whole the actual situation could be a good measure of the lack of integration of our 
banking institutions, the progress that have to be done to restore solvency and stability for 
both banking systems and financial markets.    
 
Conclusion 
As regards our previous discussion, the new banking model for XXI century should refocus 
on the collect and the distribution of long term lending and retail activities. The current 
crisis has shown that the transfer of debt into financial market can lead to an increase of 
risk not only for the institution itself but also for their financial partners. Hence, the new Economic Policy in the Wake of the Crisis  AE 
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model could contribute to renewal of universal banks, which consider retail banking as their 
core business. Their ability to diversify risk and to respect more carefully capital adequacy 
are the main factors to justify such a position. 
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